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I. Introduction
In May 2013 Barclays Bank in the UK announced it was shutting down 
the accounts of four Somali Money Service Businesses (MSBs) includ-
ing Dahabshiil, the largest remittance company operating in the Somali 
regions. Following international uproar, and a Somali diaspora-led 
grassroots campaign, the UK government took on the task of setting 
up an Action Group on Cross Border Remittances and a Somali-UK 
Safer Corridor Pilot Project with the aim of finding a durable solution 
to the problem. Two years later, however, the Safer Corridor Project 
has collapsed. Legal remittance flows persist, albeit in a fragile and 
precarious environment. This paper provides a brief update on the 
Safer Corridor Initiative, its challenges, and how the money transfer 
sector has been adapting to the process.1
II. De-Banking
Over the last few years, mounting pressure from international finan-
cial regulators and policy makers (particularly in the US and the UK) 
has led to tighter regulation around the prevention of money laun-
dering (Anti-money laundering, AML) and the financing of terrorist 
activities (Counter-terrorist financing, CFT). The post 9/11 financial 
war on terror has meant that banks are expected to abide by Know 
Your Customer (KYC) regulations, and are held accountable if their 
customers are financing terrorism-related activities or money launder-
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ing. For example, in 2012 HSBC was fined $1.9 billion by US author-
ities for money laundering offences and lack of controls, and as a 
result closed down its MSB accounts. These changes have been part 
of a wholesale de-risking and de-banking approach, which has more 
recently impacted on the Muslim charity sector in the UK. In 2014, the 
accounts of various Muslim organisations, including Finsbury Park 
Mosque and the Cordoba Foundation, were closed. Concerns with 
regulation have meant that access to financial services has become 
increasingly discriminatory, based on perceptions rather than factual 
information about the organisations and the countries affected. Mus-
lim organisations, or those linked to unstable, developing countries or 
those with a presence of terrorist groups, such as Somalia, have been 
unduly affected. This tightening regulation around financial flows has 
not been confined to the UK and the US. Earlier this year, the Kenyan 
government also shut down the accounts of 13 Somali remittance com-
panies suspected of financing terrorism following al Shabaab’s attack 
at Garrissa University where 148 students were killed.2
It is within this global climate that on the 8th May 2013 Barclays 
Bank in the UK announced that it planned to shut down the accounts 
of 250 MSBs. These closures included four Somali MSBs operating in 
the UK: Dahabshiil (the largest in the Somali remittance market and 
a major player in the formal economy of the Somali regions), Mus-
taqbal, Tawakal and Horyaal. This decision came as a result of Bar-
clays Bank weighing up the perceived risks and due diligence costs 
against the profitability of banking MSBs.3 The MSB sector has histori-
cally been perceived as risky by banks and regulatory authorities, and 
banks came to realise that the fines associated with non compliance 
with AML and CTF were seen to outweigh the benefits of providing 
accounts to MSBs.
This has had severe repercussions on the Somali financial sector. 
There are no internationally recognised banks in the region, and only a 
very fragile central banking system exists. Consequently, Somali MSBs 
are responsible for sending over 1.2 billion USD to the Somali regions, 
more than international aid, foreign investment and exports together.4
Furthermore, the system is crucial for providing financial services and 
for linking the unbanked with the banked sectors of the population. It 
is considered to be cost efficient in contrast to large remittance compa-
nies such as MoneyGram and Western Union which are not well rep-
resented across the Somali regions and charge considerably more than 
most Somali MSBs.5 Aside from WorldRemit,6 which operates online, 
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all remittance companies lost their banking accounts in September 
2013 as Barclays was the last bank to offer accounts to MSBs in the UK. 
As evidence by Oxfam reports, these closures constituted a significant 
threat to the Somali lifeline.7
III. The Safer Corridor Pilot
Whilst the UK government was initially reluctant to intervene—citing 
the problem as a ‘commercial’ one over which they had little control—
this changed following a 2013 campaign which saw Somali community 
activists working alongside academics and NGOs (Oxfam and Adeso). 
In October 2013, the government committed to setting up an Action 
Group on Cross Border Remittances composed of three working 
groups, one of which was in charge of designing and implementing 
the Safer Corridor Pilot Project for UK-Somali remittances. The advisory 
group overseeing the project included SOMSA, community represen-
tatives, banks, regulators, NGOs, international partners and the UK 
and Somali governments.
The Safer Corridor Pilot was set up to create “a more transparent 
and safer system for Somalis in the UK to send money back home.”8
It aimed to ensure that flows to the Somali regions remained in place, 
creating an effective regulatory framework to address banks’ concerns, 
while enabling them to  re-establish business relations with credible 
MSBs. In doing so it sought to initiate various interventions through-
out the process of remittances flow—from sender to receiver—thus 
addressing security and compliance risks. The UK Department for 
International Development (DfID) was the lead department tasked 
with funding the project and bringing relevant stakeholders together, 
while the World Bank was responsible for the design and implemen-
tation of the project. Consult Hyperion were commissioned by the 
World Bank to undertake research in the Somali regions, which was 
outsourced to another consultancy firm called Katuni. They conducted 
a small sample survey in the Somali cities of Galkayo, Hargeysa and 
Borama. This consultancy was one of many projects commissioned by 
the World Bank and DfID throughout the duration of the Action Group 
and Safer Corridor project.9 Consultancy after consultancy nonetheless 
failed to provide any tangible results. 
One of the prevailing issues to emerge early on in the project was the 
necessity of persuading banks to take ownership of the project. While 
DfID provided a number of guidelines on compliance for MSBs,10 and 
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arranged meetings and discussion groups aimed at persuading banks 
to take on remittance accounts, they could not assure banks they would 
not be fined should an AML or CFT issue arise. All DfID could do was 
improve the perceptions of risk, and support MSBs in strengthening 
their compliance procedures. They could not ultimately guarantee that 
banks which opened accounts for compliant MSBs would be exempt 
from incurring fines if these companies were subsequently found to be 
engaged in financial terrorism or money laundering related activities.
A second major concern was the proposed idea of the Third Trusted 
Party. Consult Hyperion envisaged that the data of transactions from 
the UK to Somalia/Somaliland would be stored and managed by a 
Third Trusted Party. However, issues relating to the nature of the 
proposed entity, its location and precise function remained unclear. 
During the numerous consultations and community engagements, 
MSBs and Somali members of the public raised concerns around data 
protection, privacy, and other security issues.
During our interviews with MSBs, directors commented on a felt 
sense of injustice and unnecessary suspicion when it came to their 
operational procedures and systems. An environment of distrust, they 
explained, had generated suspicion between MSBs and others tasked 
to address and improve the situation. Further confusion existed about 
what precisely was required of MSBs in order to qualify for a bank 
account. There seemed to be a certain level of frustration with the per-
ceived lack of direction and the slow pace of developments around the 
project.
In early 2015, after several delays in the timeline of the project, 
issues emerged in relation to the management of the project by the 
World Bank. Due to yet unknown circumstances the Safer Corridor 
project ceased. Two years later, it remains unclear whether the pilot 
will be ever completed. The UK government has now shifted to a more 
medium-long term Safer Corridor Initiative, which will address the 
structural flows of remittance flows working closely with the Central 
Bank of Somalia and the Federal Government of Somalia.11 The US 
State Department has more recently taken control over the manage-
ment of the Safer Corridor project and released a Request for Interest 
to capacity build Somali financial institutions including the Central 
Bank of Somalia and Somali MSBs in the Somali regions. The US Trea-
sury is now leading the project, but further clarity and details of this 
initiative are still pending.
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A. Remittance Flows Continue
Meanwhile, all MSBs with the exception of Word Remit, have now lost 
their bank accounts in the UK. Prior to the bank account closures there 
were three different ways (or transfer channels) to send money via 
MSBs. The first, which is also the most common method used, involves 
individuals sending money via their local agents, either in cash or 
through digital transaction. Local agents then transfer the cash to the 
MSBs’ specific bank accounts. The second is used when senders take 
the money directly to the MSB’s own office and pay in cash over the 
counter, and the third involves the transfer the money from the send-
er’s bank to the MSB’s bank account.12 In all three channels once the 
MSBs receive the money in their accounts, it is transferred to a clearing 
house, often in Dubai, and subsequently to Somalia or Somaliland. 
These transfers are typically categorised into three miles. The first mile
involves agents depositing monies into an account of a UK MSB, which 
then the MSB then transfers to a third party clearing house, often based 
in the UAE. The second mile involves the settling of payments using 
trade-flow mechanisms to reimburse in-country agents, and the third 
mile takes place in the Somali regions where the local agent receives the 
payments to settle.13
The process of transferring money has been complicated since the 
closure of MSB bank accounts, as MSBs have struggled to offer trans-
fer services for individual senders. In order to address this challenge, 
MSBs have opted to work with a third party, for example MoneyCorp 
or Choice,14 to collect the cash once senders deposit it with the local 
agent. To complicate matters more, such third parties are offering par-
tial services and are not willing to collect the cash from the agents but 
instead insist that MSBs arrange a central collection point. This pres-
ents added labour costs due to physical cash collection but also real 
and immediate risks to MSBs, their employees and the industry as a 
whole. Thus far, business transactions are largely unaffected because 
the Bank of Abu Dhabi has agreed to accommodate such transactions 
but this may well change in the near future. Furthermore, there is the 
possibility that intermediaries such as MoneyCorp and Choice may 
be forced to end collaboration with MSBs if the situation in the Somali 
money transfer industry does not improve.
Companies such as MoneyCorp, which provide similar services to 
Somali MSBs, are fully operating in the UK, and have not been sub-
ject to the restrictions affecting Somali MSBs. Questions have been 
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raised by community leaders about what they perceive as unequal 
access to banking services. For example, Mohamed Ibrahim, Director 
of the London Somali Youth Forum stated, “We sense unfairness in 
how Somali people are treated by banks who view them as suspicious 
and untrustworthy that is evident in the massive account closures 
while other organisations who handle in the same exact industry are 
operating freely. Can we speak of racism here?” The sense of unfair 
treatment was also expressed by the SOMSA chairman who noted that 
“the reality is that we are of course losing great market share due to 
the closure of our bank accounts only to be picked up by rival orgnisa-
tions.” Despite these challenges remittance flows to the Somali regions 
continue, albeit in a way that is less transparent and, inadvertently, can 
more easily facilitate money laundering and terrorism-related activi-
ties.
IV. Regulatory Challenges
Our research has shown that MSBs at the first mile demonstrate a 
greater understanding of the requirements and risks at stake, particu-
larly owners and senior staff members in the UK, UAE and USA. Most 
suggest that their current money transfer IT systems are not conducive 
to acceptable standards that meet the demands of financial regulators 
and compliance and financial procedures. As one senior MSB man-
ager pointed out to us, most technical money transfer systems “are 
built in-house by our own IT engineers and, therefore, most violations 
are to do with the security aspects of the systems.” However, he also 
reiterated a commitment to improve the services through innovative 
solutions which meet regulatory obligations. This might involve, for 
example, moving the MSB online (ecommerce) and dealing with oper-
ational requirements of any new IT system that is adopted, (i.e. disas-
ter recovery, high availability, system performance, usability etc.). 
That said, many MSBs indicated the need for guidance and training in 
order to meet the demands of acquiring and using technical solutions 
that comply with required international compliance and procedures. 
Arguably, the Somali remittances industry has been slow in working 
collaboratively or in offering training and guidance. Indeed, current 
challenges have existed for more than a decade.
Regulators are particularly concerned about the physical transpor-
tation of large amounts of cash between the second and the third miles. 
Continuous transportation of physical cash takes place at least twice a 
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week from various parts of the Somali regions to Dubai and vice ver-
sa—a process which lacks transparency. The cash is carried with cabin 
size bags to and from Dubai to meet the supply and demand of cash 
flow. Due to the fact that the banks treat this money, albeit legally, as 
foreign exchange transactions, profits of up to 2 per cent can ensue in 
the transfer from US Dollar to UAE Dirham. This makes it an attractive 
financial activity.
Finally, compliance regulations are of greatest concern in the last 
mile. The traditional kafaala system (identification through clan mem-
bership) is still widely used as a credible form of identification. This 
means if someone cannot be formerly identified during remittances 
collection, s/he needs to bring a well known and/or respected clan elder 
to vouch for her/him. Only those with foreign Passports (i.e. Djibou-
tian, Ethiopian, European, American etc.) are readily identified. In the 
absence of formal identification, community contacts and clan-based 
identification systems remain the most reliable means of identifying 
individuals. However, this system has little credibility with Western 
banks and international law-enforcement agencies. In late 2014 the 
Somaliland government started to implement national ID cards, which 
could also be used for identification purposes. However, this project is 
still far from completion. This underpins the concerns of international 
regulators in terms of KYC and AML as there are virtually no effec-
tive KYC procedures in place. While aggregated cross transactions 
checks are performed in order to monitor individual behaviour when 
transferring—thus enabling MSBs to identify any ‘suspicious’ transac-
tions—the actual identity of the receiver is harder to ascertain.
V. State-owned and Newly Emerging Private Banks
Poorly functioning public financial institutions and weak governance 
are major constrains for the MSB sector. The central banking systems 
in Somalia and Somaliland are not developed enough to undertake 
supervisory roles of monitoring the MSB system. The Somaliland Cen-
tral Bank has only recently introduced a Supervisory Unit with some 
capacity training provided by the World Bank. As in other sectors, 
however, state institutions are far less developed than the private sec-
tor, which has flourished despite political instability in the region. 
A power disparity exists between the private sector and government 
institutions in Somaliland. Often private organisations make sugges-
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tions to regulate their own industry and the government abides by 
this, thereby blurring accountability.
Meanwhile, the remittance market has been developing in the 
Somali regions. Over the last few years, we have seen the emergence of 
private banking institutions operating in the area. Salaam Bank opened 
in 2009 and offers current accounts, ATM machines, web surfer cards 
(prepaid), and limited credit. Dahabshiil Bank opened in late 2014, 
offering general banking services including both current and busi-
ness accounts. These banks issue cheques, some of which are inter-
changeable between these institutions. Although not internationally 
recognised, due to the lack of a centralised banking system, some of 
these banks can perform international transfers through recognised 
corresponding banks (E.g. Salaam African Bank in Djibouti). These 
transactions are, however, slow and expensive. Some have been work-
ing towards providing a swift system, but this has not yet materialised. 
Furthermore, these banks tend to service businesses but are less likely 
to service NGOs or individuals, due to the high costs involved, and 
the fact that remittance companies offer similar and cheaper services. 
All banks currently operating in Somaliland have been awarded Sha-
ria-compliant licenses, in the absence of a commercial banking law in 
the country.
These licenses enable them to offer a wide range of services in order 
to meet the increasing local demand. Central to the Sharia based bank-
ing is the absence of interest charges on economic transactions and a 
duty to avoid reckless risk-taking.
A key development of the last few years has been the expansion of 
mobile money systems such as ZAAD and E-Dahab in Somaliland, 
EVC Plus in South Central Somalia, Sahal in Puntland, as well as the 
more recently established Taaj. These companies currently present a 
huge threat to the existence of traditional remittance business models 
described above. Mobile money is becoming increasingly entrenched 
across the Somali regions, especially in urban areas and among 
younger generations. Many recipients of remittances are now accus-
tomed to mobile money and that service is currently solely controlled 
by telcos such as Telesom, Gollis and Hormood. There have also been 
connections between MSBs, Telcos and Banks. The Zaad system, for 
example, is a platform provided by Telesom, which also links up with 
Salaam Bank accounts. Money that is held in a Salaam bank account 
can be transferred to an individual’s ZAAD mobile phone account, 
and vice versa. A limited number of traditional MSBs, including Mus-
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taqbal and Tawakal, have also joined up with Zaad so that remitted 
money can be directly sent to the recipients’ mobile phone. Similarly, 
mobile platforms EVC and Sahal are owned by companies Hormuud 
and Golis respectively. Telesom, Hormuud and Golis, although oper-
ating with great local independence and ownership, are linked to its 
pioneer and prominent shareholder Mr Ahmed Nur Jim’ale. Inspired 
by the large network of Mr Ahmed Nur Jim’ale, Taaj has recently pen-
etrated the international market, enabling diaspora Somalis to directly 
send their money to the intended recipients across the Somali regions.
The upsurge in mobile money infrastructure and use can in great 
part be associated with the failure to address the challenges in the 
remittances industry after massive account closures by banks and the 
ongoing demand for money transfer services. Furthermore, mobile 
money services transfer money quickly, cheaply, efficiently and 
through transparent procedures. Having said that, greater scepticism 
exists about the reliability of the mobile money infrastructure among 
users. Local people in Somaliland use the term ha igu dhixin that trans-
lates as “do not [keep it on the phone] overnight.” Discussions with 
young Somalilanders revealed their lack of trust that ZAAD money 
was real money. As one young female user in Somaliland explained 
to us, “it’s just a number on my phone! How do I know it’s actual 
money?” In sum, most people ensure that the money they receive on 
their phones is immediately transferred to a bank account to avoid 
potential loss of funds in the event of a system failure. Despite these 
suspicions, MSBs are beginning to realise the importance of mobile 
money, and are recognising the need for a mobile money platform that 
can compete with existing Telcos.
Another question is whether mobile money can effectively provide 
a substitute for traditional MSBs cash transfers. As mentioned, mobile 
money is widespread in urban areas and amongst youth, but less so in 
rural parts of the country, and among older Somalis. Those who are 
not able to operate a mobile phone (often older women) rely on other 
family members who are able to do so, charging them with the respon-
sibility of managing their money. A final concern with the remittance 
closures was the extent to which the development industry, NGOs 
and charities working in the Somali regions, were reliant on remit-
tance companies to process salaries to their own employees, but also 
to process their cash transfers to the rural poor. This continues to be a 
concern.
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VI. Concluding Remarks and The Future
The main challenges facing the Somali money transfer industry can be 
largely attributed to two main factors. First, there are concerns around 
compliance and how to meet international financial regulations. Sec-
ond, the lack of professionally operating banking systems in the Somali 
regions does not only exacerbate the problems but is part and parcel of 
the chain of critical challenges facing Somali MSBs. So what can be 
done and how can these challenges be addressed in the immediate and 
long term?
There is a need for professional, sound and well-regulated financial 
banking systems that meet global standards across the Somali regions. 
It is therefore important to aid the Central Banks of Somalia and 
Somaliland, in developing regulatory and supervisory mechanisms to 
ensure that current legislation is implemented effectively. A function-
ing and well-regulated financial banking system will enable proper 
checks and balances to be carried out through the Central Banks, 
which, in turn, should restore trust in the Somali financial industry as 
a whole. More importantly, a well-regulated banking system across the 
Somali regions would ensure that money laundering and the financing 
of terrorism are curbed.
Additionally, a Central Know Your Customer System (CKYCS) with 
biometric identification to meet international standards, which MSBs 
can share for critical identification processes, could serve as a via-
ble option to mitigate compliance risks. Some challenges in terms of 
trust in relation to a shared data platform are foreseeable. These could 
potentially be addressed by including the Somali Money Services 
Association (SOMSA) in the process. Widespread scepticism about 
financial data management and ownership needs to be addressed in 
order to bring important industry stakeholders on board.
Furthermore, the physical transportation of cash to and from Dubai, 
while not unlawful, needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency to 
ensure greater transparency and accountability. A more stable cen-
tralised banking system in the Somali regions would undoubtedly rec-
tify this.
Finally, any development towards capacity building or training 
should take cognisance of all three miles and their interconnections. 
Only by so doing can we work towards the creation of a fully function-
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Notes
1. This paper is based on research carried out in London, Dubai, Hargeysa, Somaliland 
by the authors between 2014–15. Mohamed Aden Hassan carried out three focus groups 
with members of Somali Money Services Associations (SOMSA) UK and an in depth 
interview with the chair Mr Micin Ali. He also conducted interviews in Dubai and 
Hargeysa with the owners and senior mangers of twelve MSBs as well as senior staff 
members of leading Telcos including Telesom, NationLink and the director of Somalil-
and Association of Telcom Operators. Furthermore, essential discussions were carried 
out with ZAAD’s senior staff, Salaam Bank, and Governor of Somaliland Bank as well 
as four Somaliland Government Ministers and political leaders, a board member of the 
Somaliland Electoral Commission and directors of four local NGOs. Giulia Liberatore 
conducted interviews in 2013 with directors of Somali MSBs, community activists and 
other stakeholders involved in the Safer Corridor Pilot Project in London. She also 
interviewed government officials, directors of MSBs and of other financial institutions 
in Hargeysa, Somaliland. This research was conducted as part of the project entitled 
‘Diaspora engagement in war torn societies,’ funded by the Leverhulme Trust under the 
Oxford Diasporas Programme.
2. However, in early June all 13 licenses were reinstated by the Central Bank of Kenya 
after it had carried out due diligence on critical compliance matters concluding that 
financial regulations were satisfied.
3. Lindley, A and Mosley, J. (2014) Challenges for the Somali Money Transfer Sector. 
Nairobi, Kenya: Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper, pages 4–5.
4. Hammond, L. et al (2013) Family Ties: Remittances and Livelihoods Support in Punt-
land and Somaliland. Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit—Somalia. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that actual numbers far more exceed 2 billion per year.
5. Watkins, K & Quattri, M (2014) Lost in intermediation: How excessive charges under-
mine the benefits of remittances for Africa. ODI.
6. World Remit operates online and remains the only organization that is able to escape 
the account closures. Its model eliminates actual cash transfers while meeting all the 
necessary international financial regulations. In general financial regulators argue 
that greater cash flows and circulations undermine important compliance procedures 
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whereas online money transfers offer more transparency which satisfies regulatory 
demands.
7. Oxfam (2015) Hanging by a Thread: The Ongoing threat to Somalia’s remittance life-
line and Oxfam (2014) Keeping the Lifeline Open: Remittances and Markets in Somalia.
8. Dfid (2015) Safer Corridor Pilot for UK-Somali Remittances: Stakeholder Engagement 
Summary: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/418688/15-03-20_SCP_Stakeholder_Engagement_Summary.pdf
9. Several other consultancy projects were commissioned throughout the duration of the 
project. For example, Beechwood International were funded to produce the ‘Safer Corri-
dors Rapid Assessment: Somalia and UK’ report in 2013.
11. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/348648/Money-laundering-guidance-for-money-service-businesses.pdf
12. For an update on the UK government’s involvement in the Safer Corridor Project and 
Initiative see: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/471064/UK-Somalia_Safer_Corridor_Initiative.pdf
13. In addition, MSBs cater for business customers including (I)NGOs, which normally 
involves a bank to bank transfer. For further information on how the remittance system 
works see A. Lindley (2009) ‘Between ‘dirty money’ and ‘development capital’: Somali 
money transfer infrastructure under global scrutiny,’ African Affairs, 108 (433), and 
M.H. Hassan and C. Chalmers (2008) UK-Somali Remittances Survey. Dfid
14. MoneyCorp is a UK-based company which offers foreign exchange services to indi-
viduals and companies, and Choice is a payment service provider which offers a range 
of payment options—from bank account transfers, to cash pick-ups and mobile wallet 
top ups.
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